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I INTRODUCTION1 
Despite its inclusion in the White Paper draft Bill of Rights,2 an explicit 
reference to the Treaty of Waitangi (hereafter the "Treaty")3 was omitted 
from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (hereafter the "Bill of Rights").4 
This led some to lament that "another opportunity" had been lost "to bring the 
Treaty more fully into New Zealand's constitutional life".5 The view was 
taken that the Treaty remained unenforceable in the courts, except in so far 
as it had been incorporated in legislation.6 
However, there is cause for greater optimism. The Bill of Rights gives implicit 
recognition to the Treaty of Waitangi. This paper establishes that s 20 of the 
Bill of Rights requires the Treaty of Waitangi to be implemented. 
The paper focuses upon the meaning of s 20 of the Bill of Rights, which 
provides that minorities "shall not be denied" the right to enjoy their culture, 
religion and language. It identifies the appropriate approach to the 
interpretation of s 20 of the Bill of Rights. Since s 20 is modelled on Article 
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter the 
"Covenant"),7 an analysis of that Article is central to this enquiry. To this end 
the paper embarks upon a detailed study of international practice under 
Article 27 of the Covenant, including the practice of the Human Rights 
Committee under that Article. 
I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Antony Shaw, my supervisor. I also wish to thank 
Dr Paul McHugh, Tutor of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, for his helpful comments. Any errors or 
inadequacies remain my responsibility. 
2 A Bill of Rights For New Zealand: A White Paper, New Zealand. Parliament. House of Representatives. 
1985. AJHR. A 6. p 74. 
3 89 CTS 473. 
4 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, No 109. 
5 P McHugh The Maori Mag,,a Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland, 1991) 57. 
6 The rule established in Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotca District Maori Land Board [ 1941] AC 308, 324. 
7 999 UNTS 172. 
LAW ll2!1A 'lY 
VICTORIA u ;,:vERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
1 
2 
The paper identifies two possible interpretations of Article 27, one negative, 
emphasising that States need only tolerate minorities, the other positive, 
requiring States to take positive measures to help minorities enjoy their 
culture. It establishes that a positive interpretation is the correct 
interpretation in the light of practice under the Covenant. 
The paper then considers whether the implementation of the Treaty of 
Waitangi is a positive measure required of New Zealand under Article 27. 
This requires a careful analysis of New Zealand's reports to the Human 
Rights Committee and of the Committee's consideration of those reports. It 
emerges that both New Zealand and the Committee perceive that the 
Treaty's implementation is an integral aspect of New Zealand's obligations 
under Article 27. 
The paper also considers the implications of this interpretation of Article 27 
for the meaning of s 20 of the Bill of Rights. 
II SECTION 20 OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
On its face, s 20 does not appear to require the Government to take any 
measures in favour of minorities, let alone to implement the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Section 20 provides: 
A person who belongs to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority in 
New Zealand shall not be denied the right, in community with other 
members of that minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and practise 
the religion, or to use the language, of that minority. 
The negative formulation ("shall not be denied") appears to impose only a 
duty of toleration; the Government must allow minorities to pursue their 
3 
cultural activities but need not take positive measures to assist them. This 
interpretation is supported by the White Paper commentary on the draft Bill 
of Rights:8 
What Article 13[91 is aimed at is oppressive government action which 
would pursue a policy of cultural conformity by removing the rights of 
minorities to enjoy those things which go to the heart of their very 
identity - their language, culture, and religion. 
The meaning of s 20 has not yet been tested in the courts. However, the 
Court of Appeal has indicated the appropriate approach to the interpretation 
of the Bill of Rights in general. In interpreting the Bill of Rights it is 
important to consider its "nature and subject matter and special character".1° 
Of relevance is the Long Title which identifies the purposes of the Bill of 
Rights: 
(a) 
(b) 
To affirm, protect and promote human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in New Zealand; and 
To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The Long Title has two implications for the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights. First, para (a) expresses "a positive commitment to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms" and reflects the "spirit [in which] interpretation 
questions are to be resolved". 11 It requires that the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights "be construed generously" in a manner which is "suitable to give to 
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred 
to".12 Accordingly, the starting point for an interpretation of s 20 is to adopt a 
purposive approach. 
8 Above n 2, p 87. 
9 Article 13 of the Bill became s 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
10 Noon v Ministry of Transport; Curran v Police Unreported, 30 April 1992, Court of Appeal, CA 369/9 and 
378/91, 4 per Richardson J. 
11 Above n 10, 4-5 per Richardson J. 
12 Flickingerv Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] l NZLR 439,440; above n 10, 13-15 per Cooke P. 
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Secondly, para (b) of the Long Title recognises that the Bill of Rights was 
enacted to comply with New Zealand's obligations under the Covenant. This 
confirms that "[i]n approaching the Bill of Rights it must be of cardinal 
importance to bear in mind the antecedents".13 The provisions of the 
Covenant are of central importance to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
Furthermore, the practice of other nations in the sphere of human rights is 
highly relevant, not only because the Bill of Rights reflects a commitment to 
international human rights standards, but because New Zealand's own 
practice in this area is still nascent. As Cooke P commented in the context of 
the Noort case, "we in New Zealand may be able to learn from the Supreme 
Court of Canada. They have had much more experience than the New 
Zealand Courts in dealing with declarations of rights
11 .14 
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights has its antecedent in Article 27 of the 
Covenant.15 Indeed, in every material respect the wording of s 20 is identical 
to that of Article 27. Article 27 provides: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language. 
Article 27 is framed in the same negative terms: minorities "shall not be 
denied" the right to enjoy their culture. Unlike s 20, however, Article 27 has 
already generated a wide body of practice under it. The States Parties to the 
Covenant and the Human Rights Committee have given much attention to 
the meaning of Article 27. To paraphrase Cooke P, we in New Zealand may 
be able to learn from that body of practice. Others have had much more 
experience in dealing with a provision almost identical to s 20 of the Bill of 
13 Above n 10, 17 per Cooke P. 
14 Above n 10, 14-15 per Cooke P. 
15 Above n 2, p 87. 
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Rights. 16 That practice under Article 27 is of central importance to the 
interpretation of s 20. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to draw upon that practice for a full exegesis of 
Article 27's meaning. For the purposes of this paper, there are two issues to 
be resolved. First, does Article 27 require States to take positive measures to 
help minorities enjoy their culture? It emerges that Article 27 does require 
positive measures. Secondly, is the implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi 
a positive measure required of New Zealand under Article 27? This paper 
establishes that the Treaty's implementation is required under that Article. 
III ARTICLE 27 OF THE COVENANT: POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
A Two Interpretations 
Several writers support a positive interpretation of Article 27. Chief among 
these is Capotorti, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Minorities. He 
considers that a negative interpretation of Article 27 "is too restrictive and 
does not meet the requirements of the situation".17 This is because the 
preservation and development of culture requires resources which usually 
only governments can provide. In Capotorti's view, "[i]n order to give effect 
to the rights set forth in article 27 of the Covenant, active and sustained 
measures are required from States. A purely passive attitude on their part 
16 Above n 10, 14-15 per Cooke P. 
17 F Capotorti, Special Rapporteur, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities Study 011 the Rights of Perso11s be/011gi.11g to Eth11ic, Religi.ous a11d Li11gr,tistic Mi11orities, UN Doc 
E/CN 4 Sub 2/384/Rev 1 (1979), para 588, pp 98-99. 
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would render those rights ineffective". 18 Thornberry appears to agree, 
suggesting that Article 27 can be read to impose positive duties because:19 
... in order to function, the Article must go beyond the rule of non-
discrimination and equality in law towards equality in fact, so that the 
continued existence of the minority group is not placed in jeopardy in a 
situation in which it is inherently the weaker party. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission, furthermore, has expressed the 
view that it is unsatisfactory to give Article 27 a "minimal interpretation" 
which makes it into a "redundant commentary" on the other provisions of the 
Covenant.20 
Other writers favour a negative interpretation of Article 27. Modeen argues 
that Article 27 "merely states the obvious" and is "no real advance on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights".21 Green considers it "purely 
negative" and "limited in character".22 Robinson describes Article 27 as "a 
classic example of restrictive toleration of minorities",23 while Dinstein asserts: 
"patently what we have here is a minimum - rather than a maximum - of 
rights".24 
Tomuschat identifies the two arguments which are commonly advanced to 
support a negative interpretation of Article 27. The first of these is that it 
would be unrealistic to expect those States which have limited resources and a 
18 Above n 17, p 99. 
19 P Thornberry "Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments" 
(1989] 38 ICLQ 867, 881. See also P Thornberry !11tematio11al Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford, 
1990), 185. 
20 Australian law Reform Commission The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (1986) Report No 31, 
Voll, para 175, p 130. 
21 T Mocleen The International Protection of National Minorities in Europe Acta Acaderniae Aboensis, Ser A, 
Vol 37, No 1, 1969, 108. 
22 L Green "Human Rights and Canada's Indians" (1971) l Israel Yrbk Hurn Rts 156, 188. 
23 J Robinson "International Protection of Minorities. A Global View" (1971) l Israel Yrbk Hurn Rts 61, 89. 
24 Y Dinstein "Collective Human Rights of People and Minorities" [ 1976] 25 ICLQ 102, 118. 
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vast number of minority groups to provide assistance to all those groups.25 
Tomuschat warns that:26 
Stretching the scope of Art.27 to encompass positive obligations could 
lead in the last analysis to an outright breakdown of its guiding value 
and hence to a total loss of credibility. Art.27 wrn be more effective if 
it is restricted to a hard core of obligations easily to be complied with. 
The problem with this approach is that it confuses the existence of an 
obligation with the standard of obligation. How much or what kind of 
assistance minorities should receive is a separate question from whether they 
should receive assistance. In any case, even if Tomuchat's approach is 
correct, there is no reason why the practical difficulties created by a positive 
obligation should be so great as to destroy Article 27's "guiding value". As 
Thornberry suggests: 27 
The standard of obligation is necessarily a relative one, sufficient 
perhaps to criticize or support the general direction of States' efforts, 
though insufficient to provide a ready answer to questions of detail. 
Tomuschat's second reason for objecting to a positive interpretation is that 
Article 27's drafting history does not allow for it.28 The drafting history 
confirms that a negative formulation was chosen deliberately.29 That 
formulation "seemed to imply that the obligations of States would be limited 
25 C Tomuschat "Protection of Minorities under Article 27 o( the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights" in H Mosler et al (eds) Volkerrecht als Rechtordnung, Intcrnationale Gcrichtsbarkcit, 
Mensrechten: Festchrift fur Hennann Mosler (Berlin, 1983) 949, 969. 
26 Above n 25, 969-970. 
27 Above n 18, International Law and the Rights of Minorities 186. A positive interpretation of Article 27 
implies a nexus between "civil and political rights" and "economic, social and cultural rights": see generally 
C Scott ''The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the 
International Covenants on Human Rights" (1989) 27 Osg Hall LI 769. 
28 Above n 25. See also L Sohn ''The Rights of Minorities" in L Henkin (ed) The Imernational Bill of Rights: 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 1981) 270, 284-285: 
It has been widely held that by rejecting all amendments and texts which would have broadened 
the rights of the minorities, the Commission made clear that it favoured only the more limited 
right of members of a minority to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice [sic) their own 
religion, or to use their own language. There was then, no obligation on the part of the 
government, to finance their institutions, to provide special institutions for them, or to take 
legislative or administrative action to assist them. According to this view, Article 27 is not like 
the special minority treaties of the two postwar periods. 
29 M Bossyut Guide to the "Travaux Pr6para1oires" of the I111erna1ional Covenant 011 Civil and Polilical Rights 
(Dordrecht, 1987) 493-496. 
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to permitting the free exercise of the rights of minorities".30 However, the 
importance of the drafting history should not be exaggerated. Article 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties31 states that a treaty should be 
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose".32 The context supports a positive interpretation of Article 27. 
Other provisions in the Covenant already guarantee the freedoms of religion33 
and expression34 and the right not to be subjected to discrimination.35 A 
negative interpretation of Article 27 would add nothing to these provisions. 
Furthermore, Article 2(2) of the Covenant requires States Parties to adopt 
measures which "give effect" to the rights contained in the Covenant.36 This 
implies that States must take positive steps to implement those rights.37 
Most importantly, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that the 
drafting history is to be only a supplementary means of interpretation.38 This 
30 Above n 29, 496. This was despite an earlier agreement that while other provisions of the Covenant 
"contained a general prohibition of discrimination, differential treatment might be granted to minorities in 
order to ensure them real equality of status with the other elements of the population": id, 493. 
31 1155 UNTS 331. 
32 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides: 
A Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object purpose. 
33 Article 18 of the Covenant. 
34 Article 19 of the Covenant. 
35 Articles 2(1) and 26 of the Covenant. 
36 Article 2(2) of the Covenant provides: 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
37 See below n 96 and accompanying text for the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on Article 2. 
See also W Hastings The Right to an Education in Maori: the Case from International Law (Wellington, 
1988) 19. Hastings draws the following distinction: " . .. the undertakings in Article 2 apply to rights 
recognised in the Covenant. The right recognised in Article 27 is not the right not to be denied use of a 
minority language. The right recognised in Article 27 is the right to use a minority language." 
38 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its inclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting 
from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning where the interpretation 
according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
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relegates the drafting history to a position of secondary importance. 
Tomuschat, writing in 1983, acknowledged that he was forced to rely upon the 
drafting history because no other information was available to him at the 
time; and he foresaw that the practice of the Human Rights Committee would 
"acquire an even greater weight" in the future. 
Article 28 of the Covenant establishes a Human Rights Committee to which 
States Parties must periodically report "on the measures they have adopted 
which give effect to the rights [ contained in the Covenant] and on the progress 
made in the enjoyment of those rights".39 The Committee discusses the 
reports with the Representatives of the State Party concerned. These 
discussions are documented in summary meeting records. This reporting 
system is the primary means by which the Covenant is implemented.40 Under 
Article 40( 4) of the Covenant the Committee is empowered to make such 
"general comments as it deems appropriate".41 The Committee's powers have 
been further extended by the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.42 Where a 
State Party ratifies the Protocol, the Committee is competent to receive and 
consider individual communications alleging violations of the Covenant by 
that State Party. 
The practice of the Human Rights Committee and States Parties under the 
Covenant is of central importance to the interpretation of Article 27. 
Cholewinski's research shows that this practice supports a positive 
(Emphasis added.) 
39 Article 40(1) of the Covenant. 
40 See M Shaw International Law (3ed, Cambridge, 1991) 209. See generally D McGoldrick The Human 
Rights Commiuee: Its Role in the Developmelll of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Oxford, 1991). 
41 General comments of the Committee are intended to promote co-operation between States Parties in the 
implementation of the Covenant, summarise the experience of the Committee in examining States Parties' 
reports and draw the attention of States Parties to matters relating to the improvement of the reporting 
procedure and the implementation of the Covenant: UN Doc CCPR/C/18; and see above n 40, 209-210. 
42 999 UNTS 302. 
interpretation of Article 27.43 His research is based on the State reports 
submitted under the Covenant and on the summary meeting records of the 
Human Rights Committee up to and including the Thirtieth Session of the 
Committee in 1987. 
This paper updates Cholewinski's research up to and including the Forty-third 
Session of the Committee held at the end of 1991.44 It establishes that the 
43 R Cholewinski "State Duty Towards Ethnic Minorities: Positive or Negative?" (1988) 10 HRQ 344. 
44 The reports considered were the following initial reports: UN Doc CCPR/C/62/Add 1 (1991) (Algeria); 
UN Doc CCPR/C/45/Add 2 (1989) (Argentina); UN Doc CCPR/C/31/Add 3 (1988) (Belgium); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/26/Add 2 (1989) (Bolivia); UN Doc CCPR/C/36/Add 4 (1988) (Cameroon); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/22/Add 6 (1987) (Central African Rep); UN Doc CCPR/C/50/Add 2 (1989) (Democratic 
Yemen); UN Doc CCPR/C/50/Add 2/Corr 1 (1989) (Democratic Yemen); UN Doc CCPR/C/6/Add 11 
(1987) Guinea; UN Doc CCPR/C/45/Add 4 (1991) (Niger); UN Doc CCPR/C/50/Add 1/Rev 1 (1989) 
(Philippines); UN Doc CCPR/C/50/Add 1/Rev !/Corr 1 (1989) (Philippines); UN Doc CCPR/C/68/Add l 
(1991) (Republic of Korea); UN Doc CCPR/C/26/Add 4 (1989) (St Vincent & the Grenadines); Un Doc 
CCPR/C/45/Add 1 (1989) (San Marino); UN Doc CCPR/C/45/Add 3 (1991) (Sudan); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/36/Add 5 (1988) (Togo); UN Doc CCPR/C/4/Add 10 (1987) (Zaire); UN Doc CCPR/C/4/Add 
11 (1988) (Zaire). 
And the second periodic reports of: UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 2 (1987) (Australia); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/51/Add 2 (1990) (Austria); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 3 (1987) (Barbados); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/57/Add 3 (1991) (Belgium); UN Doc CCPR/C/51/Add l (1989) (Canada); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/37/Add 6/Rev 1 (1987) (Colombia); UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 10 (1989) (Costa Rica); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/32/Add 16 (1988) (Dominican Republic); UN Doc CCPR/C/28/Add 9 (1988) (Ecuador); UN 
Doc CCPR/C/46/Add 2 (1987) (France); UN Doc CCPR/C/51/Add 3 (1991) (Guinea - Note by the 
Secretary-General); UN Doc CCPR/C/57/Add 2 (1991) (Guinea); UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 13 (1989) 
(India); UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 9 (1988) (Italy); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 4 and Corr l & 2 (1988) 
(Japan); UN Doc CCPR/C/46/Add 4 (1990) (Jordan); UN Doc CCPR/C/57/Add 4 (1991) (Luxembourg); 
UN Doc CCPR/C/28/Add 13 (1990) (Madagascar); UN Doc CCPR/C/28/Add 12 (1988) (Mauritius); UN 
Doc CCPR/C/46/Add 3 (1988) (Mexico); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 10 (1990) (Morocco); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/42/Add 6 (1988) (Netherlands); UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 8 (1988) (New Zealand); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/37/Add 11 (1989) (New Zealand - concerning Niue); UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 12 (1989) (New 
Zealand - concerning Tokelau); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 8 (1989) (Nicaragua); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/42/Add 5 (1988) (Norway); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 7 (1988) (Panama); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/28/Add 11 (1988) (Panama - Note by the Secretary-General); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 11 
(1990) (Panama); UN Doc CCPR/C/51/Add 4 (1991) (Peru); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 1 (1988) 
(Portugal); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 9 (1990) (Sri Lanka); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 12 (1991) 
(Tanzania); UN Doc CCPR/C/32/Add 14 (1988) (United Kingdom - dependent territories); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/32/Add 15 (1988) (United Kingdom - dependent territories); UN Doc CCPR/C/28/Add 10 
(1988) (Uruguay); UN Doc CCPR/C/57/Add 1 (1989) (Zaire). 
And the third periodic reports of: UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 8 (1990) (Byelorussian SSR); UN 
Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 1 (1990); UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 1 (1990) (Canada); UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 
2 (1989) (Chile); UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 3 (1991) (Colombia); UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 4 (1989) 
(Czechoslovakia); UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 9 (1990) (Ecuador); UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 3 (1989) 
(Fed Rep of Germany); UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 5 (1989) (Finland); UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 1 (1988) 
(German Democratic Rep); UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 7 (1991) (Hungary); UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 6 
(1991) (Iraq); UN Doc CCPR/CnO/Add 1 (1992) (Japan); UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 2 (1990) 
(Mongolia); UN Doc CCPR!CnO/Add 2 (1992) (Norway); UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 10 (1990) (Poland); 
UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 5 (1991) (Senegal); UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 1 & 3 (1989) (Spain); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/58/Add 7 (1990) (Sweden); UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 5 (1989) (Tunisia); UN Doc 
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practice of the Human Rights Committee and States Parties under the 
Covenant continues to support a positive interpretation of Article 27. Indeed, 
in recent years this support has become more explicit. 
B State Reports 
In their periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee many States Parties 
to the Covenant have recognised that Article 27 requires positive measures to 
help minorities enjoy their culture. To date, Norway's second periodic report 
represents the most explicit recognition of this duty. The report referred to 
government policy concerning the Sarni minority in Norway:45 
... the Sarni culture must be maintained and further developed. This 
entails a departure from the previous policy of assimilation. Active 
initiatives are required to ensure the continued survival of Sarni 
culture. It is a national responsibility for the authorities to ensure that 
the Sarni people are given the means to perpetuate and further develop 
their culture so that they can continue to live as a separate ethnic 
group. 
Protecting the Sarni is not only a national responsibility. Norway also 
has an international responsibility based on commitments undertaken 
in relation to international law. The Bill[46l supports the interpretation of 
the Covenant which implies that States accept the responsibility to 
contribute positively to enabling ethnic minorities to maintain and 
advance their language and culture. 
Norway explicitly recognised that it was not enough under Article 27 merely 
to tolerate minorities; Article 27 imposed a duty to take positive action to help 
minorities enjoy their culture. In its third report, Norway notified the Human 
Rights Committee that the following provision had been inserted in the 
Norwegian Constitution:47 
CCPR/C/58/Add 6 (1990) (United Kingdom); UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 8 (1990) (Ukrainian SSR); UN 
Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 11 (1991) (United Kingdom - supplementary information); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/64/Add 4 (1991) (Uruguay); UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 2 (1988) (USSR). 
45 UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 5 (1988) (Norway), paras 140-141, pp 30-31 (emphasis added). 
46 An Act relating to the Sameting (Sarni Assembly) and other Sarni legal matters, Ot prp no 33 (1986-1987). 
See above n 45, paras 138-145, pp 30-31. 
47 UN Doc CCPR/CnO/Add 2 (1992) (Norway), para 206, p 40 (emphasis added). The report referred to 
measures adopted to benefit minorities in the areas of education, broadcasting, cultural activities and 
public administration: id, paras 207-220, pp 40-42. 
11 
It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions 
enabling the Sarni people to preserve and develop its language, culture 
and way of life. 
12 
Hungary in its third report joined Norway in explicitly recognising a duty of 
positive action under Article 27. Hungary's report informed the Human 
Rights Committee that a law on the rights of ethnic minorities was under 
preparation and that it would comply with the provisions of the Covenant. 
Significantly, the "main thrust" of the new law was described as:48 
(a) 
(b) 
Active protection of minorities with the aim of not merely 
tolerating them but promoting the preservation of their 
identities; 
Positive discrimination to ensure equal opportunity; 
( c) The principle of cultural autonomy manifested m self-
governments. 
Other States Parties to the Covenant have also given constitutional or 
legislative recognition to a duty of positive action under Article 27. Peru's 
second report drew attention to the relevant provisions in the Peruvian 
Constitution which required that the State ''preserve and encourage 
manifestations of autonomous culture"49 and "encourage the study and 
knowledge of aboriginal languages".50 Similarly, Czechoslovakia's third report 
stated that the government was constitutionally bound to "secure to the 
Hungarian, German, Polish and Ukrainian nationalities the possibility of and 
facilities for their all-round development ... ".51 According to Sweden's third 
report, furthermore, the Swedish Constitution provided that "the 
opportunities for ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to maintain and 
develop a cultural and community life of their own shall be promoted".52 
48 UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 7 (1991) (Hungary), para 137, p 22 (emphasis added). 
49 UN Doc CCPR/C/51/Add 4 (1991) (Peru), para 111, p 16 (emphasis added) (with reference to Article 34 
of the Peruvian Constitution). 
50 Above n 49, para 112, p 16 (emphasis added) (with reference to Article 35 of the Peruvian Constitution). 
51 UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 4 (1989) (Czechoslovakia), para 210, p 34 (emphasis added) (with reference to 
Constitutional Act No 144 of27 October 1968). 
52 UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 7 (1990) (Sweden), para 285, p 43 (emphasis added). The report stated that 
"special provisions had been made for the education of the Sarni population": id, para 286, p 43 (emphasis 
added). 
Argentina's first report continued this trend. Argentina notified the Human 
Rights Committee of legislative measures to ensure positive action in favour 
of indigenous peoples:53 
This law points out in its objectives that care and support for the 
aborigines and aborigine communities is of national interest and that 
their protection and advancement is necessary ... 
The Act also provides for plans of education which must safeguard and 
restore the historical and cultural identity of each aboriginal 
community, ensuring at the same time its integration on an equal basis 
in Argentine society. 
Poland's third report acknowledged that "[ a ]I though there were no formal 
restrictions in the Polish legal system on the rights of minorities, in practice 
there were many, and these irregularities have not yet been fully 
eliminated".54 This implied that Poland considered Article 27 to require 
positive measures. If Poland had thought otherwise, it would have been 
enough simply to assert that there existed no legal restriction on the rights of 
minorities. 
The State reports mentioned thus far represent those States which have given 
constitutional or legislative recognition to a duty of positive action under 
Article 27. Many States have not given such recognition but still refer in their 
reports to an established policy of helping minorities to enjoy their culture. 
For example, Australia's second report stated that, "[i]ncreasingly, 
Governments in Australia have taken special measures to provide for the needs 
of ethnic minorities".55 The report then referred to an array of government-
funded schemes to protect and promote culture and development, including 
53 UN Doc CCPRJC/45/Add 2 (1989) (Argentina) , para 236, p 55; para 238, p 56 (emphasis added) (with 
reference to Act 23.362, Argentine Congress, 30 September 1985). The report referred to health 
programmes: id, para 238, p 56; and to a National Institute of Indigenous Affairs which was responsible for 
awarding land and giving technical advice to indigenous groups: id, para 237, p 56. 
54 UN Doc CCPRJC/58/Add 10 (1990) (Poland), para 174, p 33. 
55 UN Doc CCPRJC/42/Add 2 (1987) (Australia), para 661 , p 144 (emphasis added). 
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special services to ensure equality of access and provision, and language 
programmes to meet the needs of minorities.56 
Mexico's second report asserted that " ... the Government of Mexico is 
actively promoting the preservation of the Indian peoples' cultures and 
traditions ... ".57 The National Indigenous Institute in Mexico had undertaken 
"to preserve and promote indigenous cultures and their various ethnic and 
cultural characteristics".58 Referring to its Berber minority, Algeria's first 
report stated that "Berber culture and language are increasingly fostered as 
constituent elements of the national cultural heritage".59 
The second report of the Netherlands also made reference to a policy of 
positive action:60 
Government policy is primarily geared to according minorities equal 
opportunities and an equal place in Netherlands society. Accordingly, 
measures are being taken to improve the situation of members of 
minority groups in such fields as housing, employment, education and 
welfare services. 
This policy extended to support for minority cultural activities:61 
In recent years, through financial and other forms of assistance, the 
Government has encouraged and supported the formation of new ethnic 
minority organisations and the strengthening of existing ones. 
Panama's second report referred to the Government's policy concerning the 
indigenous population as "a formal undertaking to be implemented through 
the various offices and institutions forming part of the Panamanian State and 
the instruments of government action".62 The report specified some of the 
56 Above n 55, paras 662-696, pp 144-153. 
57 UN Doc CCPR/C/46/Add 3 (1988) (Mexico), para 462, p 64 (emphasis added). 
58 Above n 57, para 450, p 62 (emphasis added). Mexico reaffirmed its policy in discussions with the Human 
Rights Committee: Summary Record of the Human rights Committee, 34th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 
849, paras 12-14, pp 3-4 (1988). 
59 UN Doc CCPR/C/62/Add l (1991) (Algeria), para 220, p 73 (emphasis added). 
60 UN Doc CCPRJC/42/Add 6 (1988) (Netherlands), para 201, p 41 (emphasis added). 
61 Above n 60, para 209, p 43 (emphasis added). 
62 UN Doc CCPRJC/42/Add 7 (1991) (Panama), para 57, p 11. 
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special measures adopted to help the indigenous population, including health, 
education and land reforms.63 
In its third report under Article 27, Iraq stated that it "not only does not deny" 
minorities their rights under Article 27, "but also pursues positive measures in 
order to enable minorities to exercise their rights without discrimination".64 
The first report of the Central African Republic referred to a similar policy. 
It explained that "pygmies, who are generally isolated in their strictly tribal 
way of life ... retain their right to be different while benefiting from the special 
measures taken by the national authorities".65 
Positive measures to help minorities maintain their own language is one of the 
most common practical ways in which States try to fulfil their obligations 
under Article 27.66 There are numerous examples. The second report of 
Mauritius informed the Human Rights Committee that a radio channel had 
been operating "[i]n order to better meet the needs and wishes of many 
religious and cultural groups ... ".67 Mexico's second report referred to 
language programmes offering bilingual education.68 In its second report 
New Zealand made reference to the establishment of a Maori Language 
Commission to ''promote the Maori language as an official language of New 
Zealand",69 of Kohanga Rea (Maori language nests)7° and of a Maori Radio 
Board.71 Poland's third report stated:72 
63 Above n 62, paras 65-80, pp 12-14. 
64 UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 6 (1991) (Iraq), para 76, p 26 (emphasis added). When pressed by the Human 
Rights Committee to give details of these "positive measures", however, the Iraqi delegation was unable to 
give a convincing reply: Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 42nd Session, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/SR 1082, paras 12-13, p 4 (1991). 
65 UN Doc CCPR/C/22/Add 6 (1987) (Central African Rep), p 12 (emphasis added). 
66 See above n 43, 349-350. 
67 UN Doc CCPR/C/28/Add 12 (1988) (Mauritius), para 48, p 12 (emphasis added). 
68 Above n 57, paras 459-461, p 64. 
69 UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 8 (1988) (New Zealand), para 149, p 29 (emphasis added). 
70 Above n 69, para 150, p 29. 
71 Above n 69, para 151, p 29. 
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It is necessary in particular to pursue activities aimed at developing the 
system of education for national minorities. . . . . [I]nstruction in their 
mother tongue is provided free of charge for children and young people 
of non-Polish nationality. 
The second report of Portugal referred to attempts to preserve the Mirandes 
language.73 In its third report Colombia stated that it recognised the right to a 
bilingual and bicultural education74 and that it was formulating a policy to 
protect and promote indigenous languages.75 Czechoslovakia's third report 
referred to provision which had been made for children to be educated in 
their native language.76 Finland's third report mentioned an Advisory Council 
for Sarni Educational Affairs which was working towards the preservation and 
development of the Sarni language and culture.77 Furthermore, the third 
report of the German Democratic Republic made reference to measures 
which assisted the Sorb minority to maintain its language.78 Mongolia's third 
report referred to the Kazakh minority which benefited from a national 
theatre, schools with instruction in Kazakh, a folklore ensemble and their own 
newspapers and radio programme.79 In its third report Spain mentioned that 
television and radio stations were promoting the use of various vernacular 
72 Above n 54, para 175, p 33 ( emphasis added). 
73 UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 1 (1988) (Portugal), para 822, p 136. The report also mentioned efforts to 
ensure that Gypsy children attended school: id, para 818, p 136. 
74 UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 3 (1991) (Colombia), para 217, p 65. 
75 Above n 74, para 218, pp 65-66. The report also referred to the creation of reserves and protected areas 
for indigenous communities: id, para 214, p 65; the protection of natural resources: id, para 215, p 65; and 
the development of health-care programmes with the active participation of indigenous communities: id, 
para 219, p 66. In discussions with the Human Rights Committee mention was also made of land grants: 
Swnmary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 33rd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 820, para 46, p 9 
(1988). 
76 Above n 51, para 212, p 34. 
77 UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 5 (1989) (Finland), para 138, p 25. The report also stated that support in the 
form of land, special rights, loans and subsidies was available for primary occupations such as farming, 
fishing and hunting: id, para 40, p 25; and that efforts were being made to produce teaching material to 
meet the needs of the Romany population: id, para 42, p 26. 
78 UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 1 (1988) (German Democratic Rep), para 84, p 19: 
In the bilingual area children and youths have both the right and the opportunity to learn and 
use the Sorb language . .... Each year some 1 million marks are spent to subsidize textbooks, 
teaching aids and similar materials for Sorb schools, schools where the Sorb language is taught 
and Sorb kindergartens. Pupils attending Sorb language classes get the texts needed for the 
purpose free of charge. 
79 UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 2 (1990) (Mongolia), para 98, p 20. The report made reference to the 
establishment of "public organizations and national , cultural and religious movements" which assisted 
minorities: id. 
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languages.80 Italy's second report stated that "[s]pecial regimes [had] been 
established for ... linguistic minorities comprising protective measures closely 
geared to the requirements of safeguarding them".81 The Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic's third report referred to cultural organisations, 
newspapers, radio and television, and language-teaching in schools, all of 
which assisted minorities.82 
It is as well to remember that, quite apart from measures designed to aid 
language maintenance, a State can take a wide range of practical measures to 
benefit minorities. In some cases the need for assistance is of a more 
desperate nature: Ecuador's third report, for example, referred to action 
taken to rectify ecological deterioration of the Amazon region, which was 
adversely affecting the social and cultural organisation of indigenous 
communities living there.83 
Measures such as these require substantial resources which, realistically, only 
the State can provide. Several State reports mention the allocation of funds 
to minorities. Italy's second report recognised the existence of linguistic 
minorities which required "particular protection and the allocation of more 
substantial autonomous resources".84 In its second report, Austria stated that 
"in 1989 more than S14 million were spent on subsidies to ... ethnic 
minorities . . .".85 Sweden's third report informed the Committee that 
80 UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 1 & 3 (1989) (Spain), para 197, p 38. The report also referred to the approval 
of a National Gypsy Development Plan: id, para 95, p 38; and of measures to integrate the Gypsy minority: 
id, para 196, p 38. During discussions with the Human Rights Committee Spain gave further details of 
financial assistance to the Gypsies: Summary Record of the Human Rights Commillee, 40th Session, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/SR 1021, para 19, pp 5-6 (1990). 
81 UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 9 (1988) (Italy), para 214, p 30. 
82 UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 8 (1990) (Ukrainian SSR), paras 132-133, pp 26-27. 
83 UN Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 9 (1990) (Ecuador), para 192, p 26. See also the discussion during the 
consideration of Ecuador's report: Summary Record of the Human Rights Commiuee, 43rd Session, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/SR ll8, para 29, p 8; para 44, p 12 (1991). 
84 Above n 81, para 220, p 30. 
85 UN Doc CCPR/C/51/Add 2 (1990) (Austria), para 263, p 51. 
"[r]eligious communities may receive funding to help finance their religious 
activities and to help pay for premises".86 Tunisia's third report noted that 
Jewish cultural associations were subsidised by local authorities.87 Hungary's 
third report stated that "[i]n 1991 the Parliament earmarked 200 million 
forints in budgetary support for minority organisations".88 Japan's third 
report advised that financial assistance had been given to improve the welfare 
of the Ainu minority in Japan.89 
It is clear that practice under the Covenant supports a positive interpretation 
of Article 27. However, it is important to recognise that there are States 
Parties which explicitly or implicitly reject that interpretation. Several States 
concluded their reports without even mentioning Article 27;90 others 
considered it enough simply to assert their compliance with the other Articles 
of the Covenant and, in particular, with Articles 2 and 26 which prohibit 
discrimination.91 This implies a perception that Article 27 adds nothing to the 
Covenant except an emphatic guarantee that members of minorities may 
exercise their rights collectively without interference or discrimination. 
Belgium's first report reflected this perception. With reference to the 
relationship between Article 27 and its Constitution, Belgium stated: 
86 Above n 52, para 291, p 44. 
87 UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 5 (1989) (Tunisia), para 160, p 158. 
88 Above n 48, para 135, p 22. 
89 UN Doc CCPR/C/70/Add 1 (1992) (Japan), paras 234-235, p 49. In discussions with the Committee the 
Japanese Representative gave further details of these measures: Summary Record of the Human Rights 
Commiuee, 33rd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 830, para 54, pp 11-12 (1988). 
90 See UN Doc CCPR/C/50/Add 2 (1989) (Democratic Yemen); UN Doc CCPR/C/45/Add 4 (1991) 
(Niger); UN Doc CCPR/C/45/Add 1 (1989) (San Marino); UN Doc CCPR/C/45/Add 3 (1991) (Sudan); 
UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 3 (1987) (Barbados); UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 6/Rev 1 (1987) (Colombia); 
UN Doc CCPR/C/57/Add 2 (1991) (Guinea); UN Doc CCPR/C/46/Add 4 (1990) (Jordan); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/42/Add 10 (1990) (Morocco); UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 12 (199) (Tanzania); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/28/Add 10 (1988) (Uruguay); UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 3 (1989) (Fed Rep of Germany); UN 
Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 11 (1991) (United Kingdom - supplementary information); UN Doc 
CCPR/C/64/Add 4 (1991) (Uruguay). 
91 See UN Doc CCPR/C/6/Add 11 (1987) (Guinea), p 28; UN Doc CCPR/C/36/Add 4 (1988) (Cameroon), 
para 118, p 26; UN Doc CCPR/C/37/Add 10 (1989) (Costa Rica), para 87, p 19; UN Doc 
CCPR/C/32/Add 16 (1988) (Dominican Republic), paras 52-53, p 19; UN Doc CCPR/C/42/Add 4 and 
Corr 1 & 2 (1988) (Japan), p 25; UN Doc CCPR/C/28/Add 13 (1990) (Madagascar), para 242, p 50; UN 
Doc CCPR/C/58/Add 6 (1990) (United Kingdom), para 81, p 127. 
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"Fundamentally, the substance of [Article 27] corresponds, like Article 26 of 
the Covenant, to the [non-discrimination provisions of] the Constitution".92 In 
its second report on its dependent territories, the United Kingdom clearly 
favoured a negative interpretation of Article 27. Referring to the Falkland 
Islands, the report stated:93 
There are religious minorities and the non-discrimination provisions of 
the Constitution mentioned in relation to foregoing articles guarantee 
their freedom to profess and practise their own religion. By reason of 
the provisions of the Constitution mentioned in relation to foregoing 
articles, minorities are in no way restricted in their rights to enjoy their 
own culture or to use their own language. Thus the requirements of 
article 27 of the Covenant are satisfied in relation to the Falkland 
Islands. 
The United Kingdom equated its obligations under Article 27 with a duty of 
non-discrimination. In its second report Canada drew a sharp distinction 
between what Article 27 required and what was being done in practice:94 
There are many minority groups in Canada, and the Government of 
Canada has not taken any steps to deny them their rights as set forth in 
Article 27. Indeed, although not in its view required to do so by this 
Article, the Government has taken ... positive steps to enhance their 
status within Canada. 
Canada's explicit rejection of a positive interpretation shows that State 
practice alone cannot conclusively determine the meaning of Article 27. State 
practice supports a positive interpretation, but it represents a subjective 
perspective. Furthermore, Canada's approach highlights a further difficulty: 
although States may take positive measures to assist minorities, that does not 
necessarily mean they consider themselves bound to do so by Article 27. 
92 UN Doc CCPR/C/31/Add 3 (1988) (Belgium), para 407, p 82. For the same approach see UN Doc 
CCPR/C/42/Add 8 (1989) (Nicaragua), para 401 , p 87; and UN Doc CCPR/C/52/Add 8 (1990) 
(Byelorussian SSR), paras 89-91, p 17. 
93 UN Doc CCPR/C/36/Add 14 (1988) (UK - dependent territories), Annex D, para 41, p 38 (emphasis 
added). 
94 UN Doc CCPR/C/51/Add l (1989) (Canada), para 142, p 25 (emphasis added). In its third report, 
however, Canada made no such reservation and referred to a wide range of measures adopted to assist 
minorities: UN Doc CCPR/C/64/Add 1 (1990) (Canada), paras 61-70, pp 9-10. 
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As Cholewinski suggests, the practice of the Human Rights Committee 
provides a more objective guide to the meaning of Article 27.95 It emerges 
that the Committee supports a positive interpretation of Article 27. States 
Parties to the Covenant must take positive measures to help minorities enjoy 
their culture. 
C Approach of the Human Rights Committee 
1 General Comments of the Committee 
The Committee has not yet produced a General Comment on Article 27,96 
but has indicated in its General Comments on other Articles that States 
Parties must take positive measures to give effect to the rights contained in 
the Covenant. In its General Comment on Article 2, which requires States 
Parties to take measures "to give effect" to the rights contained in the 
Covenant,97 the Committee stated:98 
[Article 2] recognizes, in particular, that implementation does not 
depend solely on constitutional or legislative enactments, which in 
themselves are often not per se sufficient. The Committee considers it 
necessary to draw the attention of States parties to the fact that the 
obligation under the Covenant is not confined to respect of human rights, 
but that States parties have also undertaken to ensure the enjoyment 
of these rights to all individuals under their jurisdiction. This aspect 
calls for specific activities by the States parties to enable individuals to 
enjoy their rights. This is obvious in a number of articles ... but in 
principle this undertaking relates to all rights set forth in the Covenant. 
This general approach to the implementation of the Covenant is reflected in 
the Committee's approach to the implementation of Article 27. 
95 Above n 43, 352. 
96 In the Twenty-sixth Session the Committee attempted to formulate a General Comment on Article 27 but 
could not reach a consensus: Summary Records of 1he Human Rig/us Commillee, 26th Session, UN Docs 
CCPR/C/SR 607, paras 4-50, pp 2-9; SR 618, paras 9-65, pp 2-9; SR 625, para 2, p 5 (1985); see above n 
43, 346-348. The Committee has decided to make a further attempt: see Summary Record of the Human 
Rights Commiuee, 39th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1002, paras 20-22, pp 3-4 (1990). See below n 122. 
97 Above n 36. 
98 UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev l (1989), para 1, p 3 (emphasis added). 
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2 Consideration of State reports by the Committee 
The summary meeting records show that many Members of the Human 
Rights Committee consider positive measures to be a requirement of Article 
27. Some Members have made explicit statements to that effect. For 
example, during the Thirty-first Session of the Committee's work Mrs Higgins 
made the following comment in relation to Denmark's report:99 
... the Danish Government recognized the existence of minorities in 
the country and that those minorities were not subjected to any 
discrimination. However, article 27 did not simply consist of a general 
non-discrimination clause: it required States parties to ensure that 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities were not denied the right to 
their own culture, to practise their own religion or to use their own 
language. In other words, the State should not simply play a passive role, 
but must take positive measures. 
During the Thirty-fifth Session, Mr Ndiaye interpreted Article 27 in the same 
way. In response to the statement by Mr Semino, the Uruguayan 
Representative, that "the question of ethnic, religious and linguistic rights was 
not a meaningful one for Uruguay" because all were free to exercise their 
rights in their own homes,100 Mr Ndiaye commented:101 
Mr Semino seemed to have too negative and restrictive a conception 
of Article 27: it was not enough for a State not to restrict minority 
rights; it must actively foster them through positive discriminatory 
measures in favour of minorities. 
These statements by Mrs Higgins and Mr Ndiaye could not be more explicit. 
Both considered Article 27 to require positive measures. Certainly, Mrs 
Higgins and Mr Ndiaye constitute only two Members of the Committee, but it 
is significant that no Committee Member has challenged their interpretation 
of Article 27. Indeed, many of the questions put to State Representatives by 
the Committee imply that Article 27 requires positive measures. For 
99 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 33rd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 781, para 17, p 5 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
100 Summary Record of the /Iuman Rights Committee, 35th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 879, para 29, p 6 
(1989). 
101 Above n 100, para 37, p 8 (emphasis added). 
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example, during the Forty-second Session the Committee submitted a written 
question to Sri Lanka, asking for information on the "measures taken to 
guarantee the rights of ethnic and religious minority groups and assistance 
given to them to preserve their cultural identities, languages and religion".1°2 
During the Forty-second Session Mr Herndl asked the Representative of 
Madagascar "how . . . the Government guaranteed the preservation of the 
linguistic and cultural identity of members of minorities who had Malagasy 
nationality".1°3 In the Thirty-third Session, furthermore, the Committee asked 
Australia for "additional information concerning affirmative action measures in 
the economic and cultural spheres adopted in favour of Aborigines ... 11 .1°4 
In the Thirty-seventh Session the Committee submitted the following written 
question to Portugal: "Please provide information on the practical measures 
that have been taken to protect the rights of gypsies and to preserve the 
Mirandes dialect in north-eastern Portugal ... ".1°5 Similarly, during discussion 
of the Philippines' report in the Thirty-fifth Session, Mr Ndiaye "wondered 
whether the ethnic communities had their own press and other means of 
promoting their cultures";106 and Mr Cooray, referring to tribal populations in 
the Philippines, asked:107 
102 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commi11ee, 42nd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1059, para 53, p 12 
(1991) ( emphasis added). 
103 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commillee, 42nd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1075, para 36, p 9 
(1991) (emphasis added). 
104 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commi11ee, 33rd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 809, para 24, p 5 
(1988) (emphasis added). 
105 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commi11ce, 37th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 937, para 32, p 8 
(1989) (emphasis added). The Portuguese Representative referred in response to a series of affirmative 
action measures: id, paras 35-36, pp 8-9. See also the question put by the Committee to the 
Representative of the Ukrainian SSR: 
Are any institutional measures envisaged by the Government of the Ukrainian SSR to deal on a 
systematic and long-term basis with the problems of minorities and the promotion of progress 
and reconciliation among the various national groups? 
Summary Record of the Human Rights Commi11ee, 40th Session, CCPR/C/SR 1031, para 44, p 10 (1991) 
(emphasis added). 
106 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commi11ee, 35th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 885, para 61, p 12 
(1989) (emphasis added). 
107 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commi11ee, 35th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 884, para 15, p 8 
(1989) (emphasis added). 
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. . . what opportunities those peoples were given to preserve their 
culture, to profess and practice their religion, or to use their language 
and to maintain their ancestral lands. 
Questions concerning financial assistance to minorities clearly imply a positive 
interpretation of Article 27. During the Thirtieth Session, for example, Mr 
Cooray asked the Representative of Zaire for information "on the resources 
available to [minorities] to preserve their cultures, to use their language and 
to profess their religions".108 
In his research Cholewinski draws a distinction between indigenous and other 
minorities under Article 27. He suggests that, with respect to indigenous 
minorities, the issue of whether the duty is negative or positive is "effectively 
settled" because "[i]t is generally recognized that special measures are 
required to protect and preserve aboriginal culture and language".109 
However, it is difficult to identify any distinction between indigenous and 
other minorities in the practice of the Committee. It is true that indigenous 
minorities are often socio-economically disadvantaged and are more likely to 
require State assistance, both to improve their living standards and to 
maintain their culture, and the Committee has recognised this on several 
occasions.110 But the Committee does not appear to have set a lower standard 
of assistance in the case of non-indigenous minorities. For example, during 
the discussion of Romania's report in the Thirtieth Session Mrs Higgins 
commented that, while "it was important for minorities to have a good 
working knowledge of the national language", at the same time their "minority 
108 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commillee, 30th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 734, para 32, p 9 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
109 Above n 43, 361. 
110 See, for example, Summary Record of the Human Rights Commiuee, 40th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 
1012, para 34, p 8 (1990); Summary Record of the Human Rights Commillee, 40th Session, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/SR 1021, para 24, p 6 (1990); Summary Record of the Human Rights Commillee, 37th Session, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 945, para 36, p 9 (1989). 
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rights as specified in article 27 should be guaranteed ... ".111 Mrs Higgins 
made this comment in a context which did not involve indigenous minorities. 
Questions put by the Committee should not be the sole focus of the inquiry, 
however. It is important to observe how State Representatives respond to 
those questions. Reciprocal exchanges between the Committee and State 
Representatives are a valuable guide to the meaning of Article 27, because 
they indicate whether there is a common perception of that meaning. 112 The 
summary meeting records show that many of the reciprocal exchanges, as set 
forth below, support a positive interpretation of Article 27. 
During the Thirty-Fourth Session, for example, the Norwegian 
Representative Mr Willie stated that Norway supported the interpretation of 
Article 27 which required "a positive contribution" to minorities and that 
"[t]hat was the main objective of the Act relating to the Sameting".113 In 
response, Mr Ando congratulated the Norwegian delegation and 
commented:114 
The ultimate goal of all efforts in the area of human rights was to 
achieve multiplicity in uniformity. The Act relating to the Sameting 
was a model piece of legislation in that regard, since it was aimed at 
providing the members of that ethnic minority with the necessary means 
for preserving and developing their culture themselves. That was an 
ideal approach which might serve as an example to other countries. 
Mr Ando's comment indicates that the Sameting Act was ideal because it 
guaranteed State assistance to an ethnic minority. This implicitly supports a 
positive interpretation of Article 27. 
111 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 30th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 743, para 39, p 10 
(1987). 
112 Above n 43, 356. 
113 Swnmary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 34th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 847, para 17, p 4 
(1988) (with reference to the Act relating to the Sameting of 12 June 1987). See above n 46 and 
accompanying text . 
114 Above n 113, para 29, p 6 (emphasis added). 
25 
In the Forty-third Session the Human Rights Committee asked Poland to 
provide information on "measures taken to guarantee [minority] rights under 
article 27 of the Covenant" .115 Mr Skozewska-Losiak, the Polish 
Representative, clearly understood this question to refer to positive measures 
in favour of minorities, and assumed that such measures were required under 
Article 27: "The authorities were fully aware that the protection of minorities 
required not only an adequate legal framework, but also affirmative action by 
the State".116 
The question-and-answer session between the Committee and the Finnish 
delegation in the Fortieth Session also reflected a common perception of what 
Article 27 required. In a written question the Committee asked Finland to 
"comment on progress achieved in improving the status and conditions of the 
Finnish Romanies ... ".117 Mr Gronberg, the Representative of Finland, 
replied that a new programme to improve housing conditions and grants for 
adult education in the Romany language had been introduced.118 Mr Fodor 
then asked whether "minority groups enjoyed special treatment regarding the 
use of their own languages" and, further, "what measures other than measures 
in the area of education and language had been taken to preserve the culture of 
minority groups".1 19 Mr Lehtimaja, the other Finnish Representative, replied 
that there were "numerous" measures, including the promotion of traditional 
crafts and livelihoods.120 The discussion between the Committee Members 
and Finnish Representatives clearly proceeded on the basis of a positive 
interpretation of Article 27. 
115 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 43rd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1105, para 4, p 2 
( 1991) ( emphasis added). 
116 Above n ll5, para 10, p 3 (emphasis added). 
117 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 40th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1016, para 2, p 2 
(1990) (emphasis added). 
118 Above n 117, paras 3-4, pp 2-3. 
119 Above n 117, para 7, p 8 (emphasis added). 
120 Above n ll 7, para 14, p 5. 
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Exchanges between Committee Members and State Representatives 
sometimes lead to the disapproval of a State's policy. During the discussion of 
Morocco's report in the Forty-third Session, it was clear that the Committee 
was not satisfied with Morocco's interpretation of Article 27 as a mere non-
discrimination clause. Mr Atmani, the Moroccan Representative, asserted 
that "[t]here were no problems in Morocco regarding ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities" because "[ a ]11 Moroccans enjoyed equality under the 
law".121 Mr Herndl accepted that Morocco experienced no ethnic friction, but 
still asked "what facilities such minodties as existed, for example European 
residents, enjoyed with respect to the use of their own language and access by 
their children to schools where instruction was given in that language".122 Mr 
Herndl's question indicated that the mere absence of ethnic friction was not 
enough in his view to satisfy Article 27; he wanted to know whether the 
Moroccan government was taking positive measures to assist minorities. 
Morocco's interpretation of Article 27 provides a reminder that not all States 
perceive their obligations under Article 27 in positive terms. There are 
further examples. In the Thirty-first Session, the Representative of Trinidad 
and Tobago Mr Henry stated that "[ e ]thnic and religious plurality was a fact, 
and no majority could oppress a minority", 123 clearly implying that Article 27 
was viewed as a mere non-discrimination clause. In the Forty-first Session Mr 
121 Summary Record of the Hwnan Rights Committee, 43rd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1096, para 20, p 5 
(1991). 
122 Above n 121 , para 22, p 5 (emphasis added). Mr Atmani evaded Mr Herndl 's question by asserting that 
Moroccan society was "a melting pot ... without political minorities": above n 121 , para 28, pp 6-7. Mr 
Fodor criticized the Moroccan position, stating that the existence of minorities was a question of fact and 
not of policy: above n 121, para 56, p 13. Note that, during discussions on the formulation of a General 
Comment on Article 27, Mrs Higgins referred to the need for "comments which would make States parties 
refrain from declaring, as they frequently did, that there was no need for them to describe the situation of 
minorities as all their citizens were equal": Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 39th Session, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1002, para 21, pp 3-4 (1990). See further, above n 96. 
123 Summary Record of the Iluman Rights Committee, 31st Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 767, para 20, p 5 
(1987). 
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Ramaswamy, the Indian Representative, told the Committee that "all human 
and fundamental rights and mechanisms for redress were equally available to 
minorities",124 and made no mention of positive measures. Furthermore, 
during the Thirty-second session, the Committee asked France in a written 
question whether it had adopted any "measures to assist in maintaining native 
cultural traditions or languages in various regions of the Republic where such 
traditions ex:isted".125 The Representative of France Mr Vienot replied that 
"State intervention was generally considered unlawful and even dangerous" 
and that "[t]he Community bore the main responsibility for maintaining 
regional cultures".126 
There clearly are States which perceive Article 27 in negative terms. But it is 
also clear that these States are out of step with the practice of the Human 
Rights Committee under Article 27. The summary records show that the 
Human Rights Committee favours a positive interpretation of Article 27. The 
explicit support which Mrs Higgins and Mr Ndiaye give to a positive 
interpretation is highly persuasive. Furthermore, the general pattern of the 
Committee's practice is consistent with that interpretation. This is confirmed 
by the views adopted by the Committee in response to individual 
communications under the Optional Protocol. 
124 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 41st Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 1041, para 57, p 13 
(1991). 
125 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commiltee, 32nd Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 803, para 35, p 8 
(1988) (emphasis added). 
126 Above n 125, para 36, p 8. However, Mr Vienot did refer -curiously, given his assertion that the French 
Government did not intervene in cultural matters - to "regional cultural associations and activity centres, 
which receive subsidies from the State and regional councils": id. 
3 Views adopted under the Optional Protocol 
To date, the Human Rights Committee has received five communications 
alleging breaches of Article 27. 127 The Committee has not been required 
directly to consider whether Article 27 requires positive measures to help 
minorities enjoy their culture. But with respect to two of these 
communications the Committee has adopted final views which give implicit 
support to a positive interpretation of Article 27. In Kitok v Sweden,128 Kitok 
was of Sarni ethnic origin but was prevented by the Reindeer Husbandry Act 
from breeding reindeer, a traditional Sarni activity. The Act permitted only 
members of Sarni villages to breed reindeer, and Kitok did not live in a village. 
One of the objectives of the Act was "to secure the preservation and well-
being of the Sarni minority".129 The Committee was satisfied that there was no 
breach of Article 27 because the objective of the Act and the regime it 
introduced were reasonable and consistent with Article 27.130 Implicit in the 
Committee's view is that Article 27 does require positive measures - such as 
legislation to control reindeer breeding - in order to help minorities enjoy 
their culture. 
The communication of Orninayak and The Lubicon Lake Band v Canada 131 
gives a strong indication that Article 27 requires positive measures. In 
Orninayak, the Canadian Government had allowed the provincial government 
of Alberta to expropriate territory of the Lubicon Lake Band for the benefit 
127 Lovelace v Canada Comm No 24/1977, UN Doc A/36/40 (1981); Ominayak and The Lubicon Lake Band v 
Canada Comm No 167/1984, UN Doc N45/40 (1990); }(i_tok v Sweden Comm No 197/1985, UN Doc 
N43/40 (1988); SR v France Comm No 243/1987, UN Doc N43/40 (1988) (inadmissible);£ P v Colombia 
Comm No 318/1988, UN Doc N45/40 (1990) (inadmissible). 
128 Above n 127, }(j_rok. 
129 Above n 127, }(j_rok, para 9.5, p 229. 
130 Above n 127, }(j_rok, para 9.5, p 229. The Committee "none the less had grave doubts as to whether certain 
provision of the Reindeer Husbandry Act, and their application to the author, are compatible with article 
27 of the Covenant": above n 127, }(i_tok, para 9.6, p 229. 
131 Above n 127, Ominayak. 
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of private corporate interests. The expropriation involved leases for oil and 
gas exploration. Ominayak, the Band's chieftain, claimed that the Band had 
undergone a transition from a way of life marked by trapping and hunting to a 
sedentary existence, leading to a marked deterioration in the health of Band 
members. The Human Rights Committee considered that:132 
Historical inequities, to which the State party refers, and certain more 
recent developments threaten the way of life and culture of the 
Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of Article 27 so long as 
they continue. The State party proposes to rectify the situation by a 
remedy that the Committee deems appropriate within the meaning of 
article 2 of the Covenant. 
The remedy proposed by Canada was an offer to the Band of a package worth 
approximately C$45 million in benefits and programmes, and a 95-square-
mile reserve in which the Band would have mineral rights over 79 miles.133 
The implication is that Article 27 requires positive measures. Due to 
difficulties experienced over several decades, the Band had reached the point 
where its survival as a minority group was under threat. The Canadian 
Government was accordingly obliged, not merely to adopt a hands-off 
approach, but actively to promote the Band's development with financial and 
other assistance.134 
The Committee's final views on the Kitok and Ominayak communications 
confirm that Article 27 imposes positive obligations upon States Parties to 
help minorities enjoy their culture. It remains now to determine whether the 
implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi is an integral aspect of New 
Zealand's obligations under Article 27. 
132 Above n 127, Ominayak, para 33, p 27. 
133 See D McGoldrick "Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights and the Human Rights Committee" [1991] 40 
ICLQ 658,667. 
134 Mr Ando submitted an individual opinion, expressing his "reservation to the categorical statement that 
recent developments have threatened the life of the Lubicon Lake Band and constitute a violation of 
article 27" because "outright refusal by a group in a given society to change its traditional way of life may 
hamper the economic development of the society as a whole": above n 127, Ominayak, App I, p 28. 
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IV THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI AS 
AN ASPECT OF NEW ZEALAND'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE27 
The practice of the Human Rights Committee shows that treaties between 
States and indigenous peoples will be a starting point for the implementation 
of Article 27 of the Covenant. In its final views on the Ominayak 
communication, for example, the Committee referred to "historical inequities" 
which constituted "a violation of Article 27 so long as they continue".135 These 
"historical inequities" included the failure of the Canadian Government to 
grant the Lubicon Lake Band a reserve as required by a treaty signed in 
1899.136 The failure to implement that treaty constituted a continuing breach 
of Article 27 of the Covenant. The Committee clearly considered the 
implementation of that treaty to be one of Canada's obligations under Article 
27. Furthermore, in its consideration of Canada's second and third periodic 
reports, the Committee confirmed the importance of treaties with indigenous 
peoples.137 
The practice of New Zealand and the Human Rights Committee under the 
Covenant indicates that the implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi is an 
integral aspect of New Zealand's obligations under Article 27. 
New Zealand's first report to the Committee in 1982 made several references 
to Maori under Article 27 but none to the Treaty except a brief mention of 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.138 However, during the discussion of the 
135 See above n 132 and accompanying text. 
136 See above n 133, 666. 
137 See Mr Wako's question, Summary Record of the Human Rights Commiuee, 40th Session, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/SR 1012, para 39, p 9 (1990): 
[he) asked whether there was any relationship between indigenous treaty rights and the self-
government proposals and settlement of land claims. Would the self-government proposals or 
sett lement of land claims abolish certain rights belonging to indigenous peoples under the 
treaty? And if so, was there any guarantee that the indigenous communities would have the 
same bargaining power as the Federal Government in negotiating a new arrangement? Would a 
new arrangement affect indigenous treaty rights? 
138 UN Doc CCPR/C/10/Add 6 (1982) (New Zealand), para 338, p 100. 
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report in the Twentieth Session, Sir Vincent Evans mentioned the Treaty in a 
question to the New Zealand Representatives. Referring to problems arising 
in other countries where indigenous peoples had been deprived of their lands, 
"he asked whether there had been any such problems in New Zealand and, if 
so, how they were being settled, having regard, in particular, to the Treaty of 
Waitangi of 1840".139 The implication is that the Treaty's implementation is 
relevant to New Zealand's obligations under Article 27. Mr Beeby, the New 
Zealand Representative, simply replied that "the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 
had confirmed and guaranteed to the Maori people the possession of their 
lands, estates, forests and fisheries" and that the Treaty of Waitangi Act had 
established a mechanism to ensure compliance with the Treaty.140 
New Zealand's second report to the Committee in 1988 gave far more 
emphasis to the Treaty. Indeed, the section of the report dealing with Article 
27 focused almost exclusively on the Treaty. It began:141 
The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840 between representative 
Maori chiefs of different tribes and the British Crown. In recent years, 
a positive and dynamic view of the Treaty has emerged whereby it is 
seen as a living social contract and the corner-stone of a positive 
bicultural relationship between the Maori people and other New 
Zealanders. Accordingly, the Treaty has been given an enhanced 
status which has in turn led, amongst other things, to a greater 
awareness of Maori cultural values. 
This represents a remarkable change in approach. Whereas in the first report 
the Treaty was barely mentioned, in the second it was designated a "corner-
stone" of race relations and a basis for the recognition of "Maori cultural 
values''. The Treaty's "enhanced status" derived from a policy that all 
proposed legislation should be scrutinized for inconsistency with the Treaty,142 
139 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 20th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 481 , para 18, p 5 
(1983) (emphasis added) . 
140 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commi11ee, 20th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 487, para 64, p 16 
(1983). 
141 Above n 69, para 143, p 28. 
142 Above n 69, para 144, p 28. 
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the Waitangi Tribunal's extended jurisdiction,143 and the landmark New 
Zealand Maori Counci/144 case.145 The report asserted: "These developments 
all reflect a new awareness of the importance of the Treaty. At the heart of 
these changes lies a cultural and political resurgence in the Maori 
community". 146 The report then specified changes in government machinery 
catering for Maori needs147 and measures to preserve and develop the Maori 
language.148 The report established a strong connection between the 
implementation of the Treaty, the enjoyment of Maori culture and Article 27 
of the Covenant. 
During the discussion of New Zealand's second report in the Thirty-fifth 
Session that connection was made even more explicit. In introducing the 
report, the New Zealand Representative Mr Beeby "outlined a number of 
important developments ... in the field of human rights" which included the 
extension of the Waitangi Tribunal's jurisdiction and the passage of the Maori 
Language Act 1987.149 Mr Beeby's introductory remarks clearly linked the 
implementation of the Treaty with New Zealand's implementation of the 
Covenant. 
In response, Mr Ando stressed "the importance" of the extension of the 
Waitangi Tribunal's jurisdiction.150 He thought "it would be useful to know 
the status of the Treaty within the legal structure of New Zealand" and 
commented that "[t]he adoption of a provision1151l stipulating that the Crown 
143 Above n 69, para 145, p 28. 
144 New Zealand Maori Council v Auome:y-General [ 1987] l NZLR 641. 
145 Above n 69, para 146, p 28. 
146 Above n 69, para 147, p 28. 
147 Above n 69, paras 147-148, pp 28-29. 
148 Above nn 69-71 and accompanying text. 
149 Summary Record of the Human Rights Commiuee, 35th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 888, para 2, p 2 
(1989). Mr Beeby also asserted that "[t]he Government was devoting more attention to the needs and 
aspirations of the Maori people": id, para 9, p 4. 
150 Above n 149, para 41, p 9. 
151 Mr Ando was apparently referring to s 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, which provides: 
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was not authorized to act in violation of the principles of the Treaty 
constituted a very positive step".152 He further suggested:153 
It would be interesting to know also what means were available to the 
Maori for ensuring full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty 
and exercising their rights with regard to the Crown, represented by 
the Parliament. 
Mr Ando encouraged New Zealand to give the Treaty the status of supreme 
law:154 
He felt that the bill of rights should take precedence within the legal 
structure of New Zealand and suggested that incorporating the 
provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi could serve as an example in that 
regard. 
These comments are of great significance. It is clear that Mr Ando strongly 
approved of any measures which helped to ensure "full compliance" with the 
Treaty. In particular, he was concerned to see that the Treaty was given legal 
status. Implicit in his comments is the view that the implementation of the 
Treaty is an integral aspect of New Zealand's obligations under the Covenant. 
The other New Zealand Representative Ms Riggie informed the Committee 
that "some of the most radical [Maori] claims had not been included in the 
comments on article 27 ... because most of the claims had no bearing on 
matters covered by article 27, namely, language, culture and religion".155 It is 
unclear what Ms Biggie meant by this. If she was dismissing the relevance to 
Article 27 of large land claims under the Treaty, Mrs Higgins clearly did not 
agree with her. Mrs Higgins asked for "opinions on the return of sizeable 
pieces of land in the context of the enjoyment of Maori culture and whether 
Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
See above n 144; New Zealand Maori Council v Allorney-General Unreported, 30 April 1992, Court of 
Appeal, CA 206/91. 
152 Above n 149, para 41, p 9. 
153 Above n 149, para 41, p 9. 
154 Above n 149, para 41, p 9. 
155 Above n 149, para 61, p 11. 
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that was an indispensable requirement of the Treaty of Waitangi".156 Mr Beeby 
replied that "land was indeed a very important aspect of Maori tradition and 
culture" and that "[t]he resolution of Maori land grievances would have a 
significant bearing on the successful implementation of the concept of 
partnership under the Treaty of Waitangi".157 This exchange confirmed the 
link between the Treaty and Article 27. Mrs Higgins and Mr Beeby agreed 
that access to land was important for the enjoyment of Maori culture.158 The 
implementation of the Treaty was accordingly relevant because it constituted 
a regime under which confiscated land could be returned to Maori. 
It emerges that the implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi is an integral 
aspect of New Zealand's obligations under Article 27 of the Covenant. That 
the New Zealand Government considers the Treaty to be relevant is implicit 
in its reports to the Human Rights Committee. In reporting to the Committee 
on the measures taken to "give effect"159 to Article 27, New Zealand focuses 
almost exclusively on the measures it has taken to give effect to the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The Committee itself has indicated that treaties with indigenous 
peoples are relevant under Article 27. In considering New Zealand's reports, 
the Committee has approved strongly of any measures taken to implement 
the Treaty of Waitangi; and has clearly linked those measures with New 
Zealand's obligations under Article 27. This interpretation of Article 27 has 
implications for the meaning of s 20 of the Bill of Rights. 
156 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 35th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 890, para 81, p 14 
(1989) (emphasis added). 
157 Summary Record of the Human Rights Committee, 35th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 891, para 3, p 2 
(1989). 
158 See also Mr Wennergren 's comment during the discussion of Canada's third report, above n 137, para 42, 
p 10: " ... quite clearly, access to land lay at the core of aboriginal rights, since without land the aboriginals 
could not enjoy their own culture." 
159 Above n 39. 
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V CONCLUSION 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires 
New Zealand to take positive measures to help minorities enjoy their culture. 
With respect to Maori, one of those measures must be to implement the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
This has direct consequences for the interpretation of s 20 of the Bill of 
Rights. Section 20 requires positive measures to help minorities enjoy their 
culture; and, with respect to Maori, one of the measures required is the 
implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Viewed in this light, s 20 has far-reaching implications. One implication is 
that every statute will need to be interpreted consistently with the Treaty of 
Waitangi.160 Section 20 is likely to have its greatest impact in the area of 
decision-making. It creates a presumption, rebuttable only by a clear 
indication to the contrary, that the Treaty of Waitangi is applicabJe.161 
A second implication is that the Attorney-General has a statutory duty under s 
7 of the Bill of Rights to report to the House of Representatives where a Bill 
introduced appears to be inconsistent with the Treaty of Waitangi.162 
160 Section 6 of the Bill of Rights provides: 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning. 
161 In Attorney-General v New Zealand Maori Council (No 2) [1991) 2 NZLR 147, 149, Casey and Hardie 
Boys JJ expressed a reservation as to the Treaty's application: 
Without accepting that the principles of the Treaty necessarily apply in the areas of decision 
making where there is no statutory provision requiring them to be taken into account ... . 
In view of s 20 of the Bill of Rights, this reservation will need to be abandoned. 
162 Section 7 of the Bill of Rights provides: 
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General shall,-
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill,-
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to 
be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights. 
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Inconsistency arises not only where a Bill contains measures which abridge 
rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. It may arise where a Bill contains no 
measures at all. If the Bill affects Maori interests, s 20 requires that it contain 
measures aimed at implementing the Treaty of Waitangi. Silence as to the 
Treaty of Waitangi - a passive approach - is inconsistent with s 20. The formal 
reporting mechanism under s 7 of the Bill of Rights must have the potential to 
encourage fuller and more systematic debate in the House on Treaty issues.163 
Section 20 does not give the Treaty of Waitangi the status of supreme law. 
Parliament retains the power to legislate in breach of s 20, 164 but that would 
be a clear breach of New Zealand's obligations under Article 27 of the 
Covenant.165 
There is great significance in the Treaty of Waitangi's implicit inclusion in the 
Bill of Rights. Section 20 provides Maori with a new and more effective 
means of enforcing their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Far from failing 
"to bring the Treaty more fully into New Zealand's constitutional life", 166 the 
Bill of Rights gives fresh impetus to the Treaty of Waitangi's resurgence. 
163 See generally P Fitzgerald "Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A very practical power 
or a well -intentioned nonsense" (1992) 22 VUWLR 135. 
164 Section 4 of the Bill of Rights provides: 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights. 
165 When New Zealand's ratification of the Covenant was before Cabinet for final decision in 1978, Foreign 
Affairs briefing papers advised the Cabinet of the consequences of ratification. One consequence was the 
obligation to legislate consistently with the Covenant: 
... future legislation . . . will need to be vetted for consistency with the Covenants. Any 
legislation enacted which may be shown subsequently to be in breach will need to be amended 
or repealed. 
Memorandum for Cabinet from Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Ratification of the International Covenants 
on Human Rights", 29 November 1978, para 11, p 3. 
166 Above n 5. 
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